Deadly Chaos in Syria: Over 1000 Civilians Executed by HTS Militants
March 9, 2025, 6:27 UTC
Syria Erupts Into Chaos
Civilians Executed by HTS Government Forces
Syria is engulfed in a wave of deadly chaos centered in its coastal region, where at least 745 civilians have been killed as part of an estimated total of up to 1,700 deaths of Alawite, Christian, and Druze civilians in a two-day period starting March 7, 2025.
The towns of Jableh, Baniyas, and rural areas of Latakia and Tartus have become scenes of mass execution by HTS forces, with scores of bodies littering streets and homes reduced to smoldering ruins.
The violence erupted when pro-Assad loyalists attacked security forces of the ruling Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) regime, prompting a brutal crackdown that spiraled into sectarian slaughter resulting in mass casualties of innocent civilians.
Predominantly Alawites, Christians and Druze citizens have borne the brunt, with reports of gunmen conducting door-to-door killings and looting.
Thousands have fled to Russia’s Hmeimim Air Base for safety, while curfews and power outages paralyze the region.
The HTS regime, under Abu Mohammad al-Julani, (now Ahmed al-Sharaa), claims these actions target regime remnants, yet the scale and nature of the killings suggest a deliberate targeting of Syrian minorities in ethnic cleansing attacks.
This article digs deeper into the background, key actors, societal fractures, and resistance shaping this crisis, offering a serious lens on Syria’s descent into further turmoil.
Russian Withdrawal and HTS Takeover
The current crisis traces its roots to late 2024, when Russia’s military support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime faltered, paving the way for its collapse and HTS’s ascent.
Russia intervened in Syria in September 2015, deploying air forces and advisors to prop up Assad against rebels and ISIS, securing key bases at Hmeimim and Tartus. This support sustained the regime for nearly a decade, but by November 2024, amid its commitments in Ukraine, Russia’s resolve weakened.
On November 27, HTS launched a rapid offensive, Operation Deterrence of Aggression, capturing Aleppo, Hama, and Homs within days. Russian airstrikes intensified briefly but proved insufficient as the Syrian army disintegrated.
By December 6, with rebels nearing Damascus, Russia’s active military backing had effectively ceased, unable to halt the advance. On December 8, Assad fled to Moscow, where he was granted asylum, and HTS seized Damascus unopposed, ending over 50 years of Assad family rule.
The fall of key cities was swift and decisive. Aleppo fell first, followed by Hama and Homs, as HTS, supported by Turkish-backed factions like the Syrian National Army (SNA), overwhelmed a demoralized military.
Damascus’s capture marked the regime’s final collapse, with rebels facing no significant resistance. Russia’s failure to mount a robust defense left its assets intact but its influence diminished, shifting focus to evacuating personnel and equipment by mid-December.
HTS declared the capital liberated, ushering in a new era under Julani’s leadership, formalized on January 29, 2025, when he was appointed transitional president at the Syrian Revolution Victory Conference.
This takeover dismantled the Syrian constitution, parliament, and Baath Party, setting the stage for the current instability as HTS struggled to govern a fractured nation.
HTS and Abu Mohammad al-Julani
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
HTS emerged in January 2017 as a merger of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS) and other rebel factions, evolving from its origins as Jabhat al-Nusra, Al Qaeda’s Syrian branch established in 2012 under Julani’s leadership.
Initially focused on overthrowing Assad and establishing an Islamic state, HTS shifted toward localized governance, particularly in Idlib, where it formed the Syrian Salvation Government in northwest Syria in 2017.
Despite a public split from Al Qaeda in 2016, when JFS was created, HTS retained a Salafi-jihadist ideology, drawing U.S. designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in May 2018, amending Nusra’s 2012 listing.
This status persists as of March 9, 2025, reflecting its history of violence, including civilian-targeted attacks during the civil war.
By December 2024, HTS led the offensive that toppled Assad, dissolving its military structure on January 29, 2025, to unify Syria under a national framework. However, its jihadist roots continue to shape perceptions and policies.
Abu Mohammad al-Julani (Ahmed al-Sharaa)
Abu Mohammad al-Julani or Ahmed al-Sharaa, born in 1982, rose from a jihadist operative to Syria’s de facto ruler.
His militant career began in 2003 when he joined al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to fight U.S. forces post-invasion, aligning with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Detained at Camp Bucca from 2006 to 2011, he connected with future ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Released in 2011, Baghdadi sent him to Syria with funding to establish Jabhat al-Nusra, under Al Qaeda’s command via Ayman al-Zawahiri, targeting Assad’s regime. As Nusra’s emir, al-Sharaa built a formidable force, earning a U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist label in 2013 with a $10 million bounty.
In 2013, Baghdadi attempted to merge Nusra with the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), forming ISIS, but al-Sharaa rejected this, reaffirming loyalty to Al Qaeda and splitting from ISIS, leading to violent clashes by 2014.
In 2016, he announced Nusra’s break from Al Qaeda, forming JFS, a move criticized by Zawahiri as disobedient, though it aimed to localize the struggle.
HTS’s creation in 2017 marked his shift toward pragmatism, expelling ISIS cells in Idlib and moderating rhetoric. By December 2024, he led HTS to power, dropping his nom de guerre and engaging diplomatically. He met with U.S. officials on December 20, when his bounty was lifted, yet his Al Qaeda and early ISIS ties remain a lens for assessing his leadership.
The Future of the Syrian People
Syria’s Societal Groups and Risks to Minorities
Syria’s population is a mosaic of ethnic and religious groups, with the Sunni Arab majority (about 74%) forming HTS’s base, contrasted by significant minorities now at risk.
Alawites, roughly 10-12%, dominated Assad’s regime and face severe retribution, exemplified by the March 7-8 massacres of over 745 civilians in coastal areas, driven by their historical role in security forces.
Christians, 5-10% of Syrians, have fled alongside Alawites, with church leaders decrying violence, though specific death tolls are unclear. The Druze, about 3%, centered in Suweida, seek autonomy and have avoided coastal massacres but remain vulnerable amid rising sectarian tensions.
Kurds, concentrated in the northeast under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), resist HTS’s centralization, their autonomy threatened by potential crackdowns.
These minorities face significant risks: Alawites from revenge killings tied to Assad’s legacy, Christians from jihadist elements within HTS, Druze from autonomy disputes, and Kurds from territorial conflicts.
The Sunni majority, while supportive initially, harbors secular factions wary of HTS’s Islamist leanings, risking internal dissent. The coastal killings underscore how the HTS’ governance struggles amplify these threats.
Resistance Groups and Their Efforts
Several factions oppose HTS, driven by ideological, ethnic, and territorial grievances, mounting varied resistance since the December 8 takeover.
Pro-Assad Loyalists/Alawite Militias: Comprising former soldiers and Alawite militias from Latakia, Tartus, and Homs, they resist HTS’s Sunni rule. Clashes began in December 2024, with a January 14, 2025, standoff in Latakia ending in a suicide bombing by an Alawite commander. The March 7-8 uprising killed over 100 HTS personnel, triggering the massacres, reflecting their aim to destabilize HTS and avenge Assad’s fall.
Syrian National Army (SNA): Turkish-backed, the SNA collaborated with HTS to topple Assad but operates independently in northern Syria. Their December Manbij capture aligned with HTS, yet their separate governance hints at future rivalry over control, posing a latent threat.
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): The Kurdish-led SDF, controlling the northeast, opposes HTS’s authority to preserve autonomy. In December 2024, they lost Manbij to the SNA, an HTS ally, but resisted further incursions. Talks on December 30 failed to integrate them, and skirmishes with SNA persist, challenging HTS indirectly through territorial defense.
Druze Militias: In Suweida, Druze resist HTS’s rule, staging protests and minor clashes since December 2024 to maintain autonomy. Their efforts remain localized but signal broader discontent with centralized power.
These groups resist HTS due to sectarian fears (Alawites), autonomy demands (SDF, Druze), or competing agendas (SNA), complicating the regime’s consolidation efforts.
Conclusion
A Stark Situation
Syria today is a nation unraveling under HTS’s faltering grip. The March 7-8 execution of over 1,000 civilians reveals a psychopathic regime resorting to reactionary barbarism to quell resistance, indistinguishable from jihadist extremism.
Alawites, Christians, and Druze face existential threats, while the SDF and SNA challenge territorial unity. The Sunni majority’s initial support is waning as governance falters, with coastal chaos signaling a broader collapse of order.
Future outlooks suggest multiple trajectories. Persistent Alawite resistance and SDF defiance could ignite wider conflict, further fragmenting Syria if HTS doubles down on repression. Diplomatic gains with the U.S. and Gulf states are set to erode if massacres escalate, isolating Jolani and HTS internationally.
Syria risks descending into a prolonged sectarian bloodbath, with minorities as the primary casualties. The jihadist roots of HTS are now bearing fruit in the ongoing slaughter of Syrian civilians—the international community has blood on its hands as it remains passive in the wake of the bloodshed.
